问题描述：
英语翻译
If Chinese firms did use retained earnings to attract external credit in the early stages of reform,the relationship between retained earnings in that context contradict both theory and empirical findings in the West.Yet in both contexts,the desire for autonomy ultimately underlies firm behavior,and,in fact,the same basic mechanism explains the seemingly juxtaposed outcomes.Research on institutional processes suggests that historical paths create critical components of markets,such as retained earnings,and the rules governing market behavior can have dramatically different meanings in different contexts (Hamilton and Biggart 1988).Historical processes that generate both the meanings associated with markets and the rules of the game can produce divergent trajectories from the same basic mechanism.In the case of retained earnings and borrowing behavior,the critical difference between the behavior of Chinese managers during transition and their western counterparts is the way managers evaluated the potential autonomy associated with capital projects funded from retained earnings.In both cases,reducing dependence is an important motivator,as resource dependence theorists suggest (Mintz and Schwartz,1985; Pfeffer and Salancik,1978),but the ability of external actors to control the firm leads to very different manifestations of the underlying desire for independence.The result in the West is that managers use their retained earnings rather than sacrifice autonomy.While in China,I expect that the opposite was true.That is,I expect that managers used retained earnings to signal security and obtain external funds.
If Chinese firms did use retained earnings to attract external credit in the early stages of reform,the relationship between retained earnings in that context contradict both theory and empirical findings in the West.Yet in both contexts,the desire for autonomy ultimately underlies firm behavior,and,in fact,the same basic mechanism explains the seemingly juxtaposed outcomes.Research on institutional processes suggests that historical paths create critical components of markets,such as retained earnings,and the rules governing market behavior can have dramatically different meanings in different contexts (Hamilton and Biggart 1988).Historical processes that generate both the meanings associated with markets and the rules of the game can produce divergent trajectories from the same basic mechanism.In the case of retained earnings and borrowing behavior,the critical difference between the behavior of Chinese managers during transition and their western counterparts is the way managers evaluated the potential autonomy associated with capital projects funded from retained earnings.In both cases,reducing dependence is an important motivator,as resource dependence theorists suggest (Mintz and Schwartz,1985; Pfeffer and Salancik,1978),but the ability of external actors to control the firm leads to very different manifestations of the underlying desire for independence.The result in the West is that managers use their retained earnings rather than sacrifice autonomy.While in China,I expect that the opposite was true.That is,I expect that managers used retained earnings to signal security and obtain external funds.
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