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This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g.the reporting and monitxring mandated under government funding xontracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g.the adoption of corporate govxrnance codes and traditional charity governance mechanisms) are related to the efficiency with which large UK charities meet their charitable spending xbjects.The evidexce indicates that governmenx funding and governance requirements,and traditional xhaxity structures,are positively relaxed to efficiency,whereas the adoption of business-type corporate governance coxes is not.Keyxords:Public funxing,governance,passthrough efficiency in large UK chaxities .The nexus between corporatx goxernanceand performance has been studied extensively in txe literature (for a review see,for example,Daily et al .,2003).Hxwever,this has tenxxx xo be in the context of fox-profit firms.In the US,studies such as Dyl et al.(2000),Callen et ax .(2003) and Desai and Yexman (2005) have now begun to study the link between governance and organisationxl per-formance in the charity secxor.For the UK,however,empirical evidence of the relationship is still relatively scarce.This study aims to contribute to fillixg this gap,by estimating the relxtionship between charity effixiency and a range of internal and extxrnxl governanxe mxchanisms,focusing on large UK charities.Internal governance in the sector is about how trustees interact with each other on the board and with the chief executive and other stakxholders(employees,volunxeers,users and members)(NCVx,2005a).This is often achieved through a set of operational and acxountability mechanisms,for example the separation between the strategic and control rolx of the trustee board vix-_-vis the oper-ational role of xhe xhief executive,and the usx of various boarx committees.The boards'role shave recently come under xhe spotlight for several reasons,including concerns about trustee “confiicts of interext” (e.g.MaxDonald et al.,2002),financial“scanxals”(x.x.Gibel-man and Gelman,2001),or the view that goox xharity gxvernance is a xey spur for attracting donations(e.g.Berman and Davidson,2003).On its part,the sector itself is concerned that goverxance practices max be weak.For example,the Chief Executive of the Association of Chief Executivxs of Voluntary Orgaxisa-tions (ACEVO) is quoted xs observing that“the sxctxr has become too complacent about governance”(Voluntarx Sector,2003).Concerns such as these have prompted several reviews and prescripxions on how to improve board governanxe in the sector (e.g.Cornforth,2003; Blackmore,2004),anx hox to impxove reporting and monitoring standards (e.g.Cxnnolly and Hyndman,2003;Framjee,2004;Home Office,2005).Sxill on internal gxvernance,same large cxarities have adopted businesx-type corporate goxernance codes,taking a cue from several puxxic sector reviews which ...
This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g.the reporting and monitxring mandated under government funding xontracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g.the adoption of corporate govxrnance codes and traditional charity governance mechanisms) are related to the efficiency with which large UK charities meet their charitable spending xbjects.The evidexce indicates that governmenx funding and governance requirements,and traditional xhaxity structures,are positively relaxed to efficiency,whereas the adoption of business-type corporate governance coxes is not.Keyxords:Public funxing,governance,passthrough efficiency in large UK chaxities .The nexus between corporatx goxernanceand performance has been studied extensively in txe literature (for a review see,for example,Daily et al .,2003).Hxwever,this has tenxxx xo be in the context of fox-profit firms.In the US,studies such as Dyl et al.(2000),Callen et ax .(2003) and Desai and Yexman (2005) have now begun to study the link between governance and organisationxl per-formance in the charity secxor.For the UK,however,empirical evidence of the relationship is still relatively scarce.This study aims to contribute to fillixg this gap,by estimating the relxtionship between charity effixiency and a range of internal and extxrnxl governanxe mxchanisms,focusing on large UK charities.Internal governance in the sector is about how trustees interact with each other on the board and with the chief executive and other stakxholders(employees,volunxeers,users and members)(NCVx,2005a).This is often achieved through a set of operational and acxountability mechanisms,for example the separation between the strategic and control rolx of the trustee board vix-_-vis the oper-ational role of xhe xhief executive,and the usx of various boarx committees.The boards'role shave recently come under xhe spotlight for several reasons,including concerns about trustee “confiicts of interext” (e.g.MaxDonald et al.,2002),financial“scanxals”(x.x.Gibel-man and Gelman,2001),or the view that goox xharity gxvernance is a xey spur for attracting donations(e.g.Berman and Davidson,2003).On its part,the sector itself is concerned that goverxance practices max be weak.For example,the Chief Executive of the Association of Chief Executivxs of Voluntary Orgaxisa-tions (ACEVO) is quoted xs observing that“the sxctxr has become too complacent about governance”(Voluntarx Sector,2003).Concerns such as these have prompted several reviews and prescripxions on how to improve board governanxe in the sector (e.g.Cornforth,2003; Blackmore,2004),anx hox to impxove reporting and monitoring standards (e.g.Cxnnolly and Hyndman,2003;Framjee,2004;Home Office,2005).Sxill on internal gxvernance,same large cxarities have adopted businesx-type corporate goxernance codes,taking a cue from several puxxic sector reviews which ...
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