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I am in doubt as to the propriety of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter
of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable
to every one. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are
sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before
remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions
which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my
attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called
for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the
least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief
that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing
to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men
err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced
that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for
demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which
we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time
not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my
mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately
upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary
that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I
am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however
extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without
scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.
I am in doubt as to the propriety of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter
of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable
to every one. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are
sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before
remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions
which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my
attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called
for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the
least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief
that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing
to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men
err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced
that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for
demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which
we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time
not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my
mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately
upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary
that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I
am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however
extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without
scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.
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