问题描述：
哪位英语大神可以帮翻译一下这点文章啊,谷歌有道之类翻译不准,请人工翻译,通顺一点.谢谢.比较急
I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy. I identified the Government and the taxi lobby as the main determinants of policy. I also gave each player a choice between two different alternative actions. For the Government, the choice is between the types of policy they opt to follow. The first choice is called ‘open policy’ where the Government allows the open issuing of new taxi licenses. The second option is called ‘closed policy’ where the Government refuses to issue licenses or issues a small ineffectual amount of licenses. The
taxi drivers also have two choices; they can opt to ‘protest’ or ‘not protest’ where protest means to engage in strikes, blockades, strenuous lobbying, and so on—in effect, anything that can impose a negative cost on the policymaker. As I moved through the periods following, I attached various values to the different positions in order to illustrate the effect of changes in policy.
PERIOD 1: 1978–1991 The first period under consideration is a relatively long phase of 13 years and lasts from 1978 until 1991. The period begins with the taxi drivers successfully persuading the then Minister for the Environment, Mr. Sylvester Barrett TD (Fianna Fáil), to suspend the issuing of taxi licenses in 1978 after they had blockaded the Butt Bridge for a week. The Irish Times on 28 August 1978 stated, ‘The strike is the culmination of a long battle by the Irish Taxi Federation for strict limits on the numbers of license plates issued’ (Boland, 1978: p. 1).
The moratorium attracted little attention during the recessionary decade of the 1980s. However, as the decade drew to a close and the first ‘green
shoots’ of economic recovery began to appear, the limit on the number of taxis within Dublin citybegan to have an effect on the quality of the taxi service. Long queues at taxi ranks began to form at night, and it became increasingly difficult to get a taxi at other busy times especially Friday afternoons (O’Connor, 1992: p. 13). The emergence of queues, the economic growth, and the commissioning of a report signaled the end of this period and the movement to Period 2.
Taxis
The taxi drivers as mentioned above obtained in 1978 a favorable ‘closed’ regulatory environment through strikes, lobbying, and court action. This closure of the policy environment is of value to the taxi drivers as it gives them monopoly power. I assigned an arbitrary illustrative value of €10 thatthe closed policy is worth to the taxi drivers (see Figure 1). An ‘open’ regulatory environment is worth €0 to the taxi drivers. As they have demonstrated to the Government, the taxi lobby is willing to ‘protest’ in order to achieve their desired outcome. The cost of ‘protest’ for the taxi drivers is €1, whereas it costs €0 for them to ‘not protest’.
没想到这么少，有思路了，麻烦再帮翻译下这些，字越多越好。谢谢了。If the Government chooses an ‘open policy’, it
receives little or no ‘democratic boost’ from the
electorate. This is because on a national level, taxi
policymaking is far down the list of priorities for
ordinary voters especially for those voterswho are not
directly affected. Further, during this early period,
there was very little general awareness of the issue
in the public domain. If the Government chooses
‘closed policy’, it receives a benefit of€2 fromthe taxi
drivers in the form of electoral contributions,
favorable comment from the taxi lobby, help ferrying
elderly voters to the polls at election time, and so on..
I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy. I identified the Government and the taxi lobby as the main determinants of policy. I also gave each player a choice between two different alternative actions. For the Government, the choice is between the types of policy they opt to follow. The first choice is called ‘open policy’ where the Government allows the open issuing of new taxi licenses. The second option is called ‘closed policy’ where the Government refuses to issue licenses or issues a small ineffectual amount of licenses. The
taxi drivers also have two choices; they can opt to ‘protest’ or ‘not protest’ where protest means to engage in strikes, blockades, strenuous lobbying, and so on—in effect, anything that can impose a negative cost on the policymaker. As I moved through the periods following, I attached various values to the different positions in order to illustrate the effect of changes in policy.
PERIOD 1: 1978–1991 The first period under consideration is a relatively long phase of 13 years and lasts from 1978 until 1991. The period begins with the taxi drivers successfully persuading the then Minister for the Environment, Mr. Sylvester Barrett TD (Fianna Fáil), to suspend the issuing of taxi licenses in 1978 after they had blockaded the Butt Bridge for a week. The Irish Times on 28 August 1978 stated, ‘The strike is the culmination of a long battle by the Irish Taxi Federation for strict limits on the numbers of license plates issued’ (Boland, 1978: p. 1).
The moratorium attracted little attention during the recessionary decade of the 1980s. However, as the decade drew to a close and the first ‘green
shoots’ of economic recovery began to appear, the limit on the number of taxis within Dublin citybegan to have an effect on the quality of the taxi service. Long queues at taxi ranks began to form at night, and it became increasingly difficult to get a taxi at other busy times especially Friday afternoons (O’Connor, 1992: p. 13). The emergence of queues, the economic growth, and the commissioning of a report signaled the end of this period and the movement to Period 2.
Taxis
The taxi drivers as mentioned above obtained in 1978 a favorable ‘closed’ regulatory environment through strikes, lobbying, and court action. This closure of the policy environment is of value to the taxi drivers as it gives them monopoly power. I assigned an arbitrary illustrative value of €10 thatthe closed policy is worth to the taxi drivers (see Figure 1). An ‘open’ regulatory environment is worth €0 to the taxi drivers. As they have demonstrated to the Government, the taxi lobby is willing to ‘protest’ in order to achieve their desired outcome. The cost of ‘protest’ for the taxi drivers is €1, whereas it costs €0 for them to ‘not protest’.
没想到这么少，有思路了，麻烦再帮翻译下这些，字越多越好。谢谢了。If the Government chooses an ‘open policy’, it
receives little or no ‘democratic boost’ from the
electorate. This is because on a national level, taxi
policymaking is far down the list of priorities for
ordinary voters especially for those voterswho are not
directly affected. Further, during this early period,
there was very little general awareness of the issue
in the public domain. If the Government chooses
‘closed policy’, it receives a benefit of€2 fromthe taxi
drivers in the form of electoral contributions,
favorable comment from the taxi lobby, help ferrying
elderly voters to the polls at election time, and so on..
问题解答：
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