问题描述：
world war one -china
how did china involved in ww1?
what are the effects of ww1 to china?political,enconomical,govertmental etc.did china furthr loss land?whatever u know
7-8 sentense.pls answer in english..as long as it makes sense and express the idea clearly,i will accept the answer.i can fix up the gramma myself.thx so much.
i promise to give u 3o marks if u hav good answer.
how did china involved in ww1?
what are the effects of ww1 to china?political,enconomical,govertmental etc.did china furthr loss land?whatever u know
7-8 sentense.pls answer in english..as long as it makes sense and express the idea clearly,i will accept the answer.i can fix up the gramma myself.thx so much.
i promise to give u 3o marks if u hav good answer.
问题解答：
我来补答
CHINA
On August of 1914, the European Theatre of the Great War began; it would be three years before the Republic of China entered this war on the side of the Allied forces. In our long history with the Western Great Powers, China has always been forced into a subservient role; with our entry into the Great War, we had hoped to enter as equals fighting alongside our European and American allies. In the end, we would be denied this opportunity and our program denied by all members of the Group of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference.
In 1914, the Republic of China was deeply distressed by the battles being waged on European soil; but, it was not until April of 1917 that we entered this war. During the outbreak of fighting and our entrance, the Republic of China would approach the prospect of checking Germany’s hegemony in the Far East with great trepidation. In 1898, Emperor Guang Xu signed the Sino-German Treaty which gave sovereign control of Kiachow Bay in China’s Northern Shantung Province to the German Empire. After seceding this territtory to Germany, we were also forced to hand over economic rights to this territory and all land immediately ajacent to the Bay.
We longed for the return of our sovereign territory and when in 1914 the Empire of Japan offered to remove the German presence from our soil, we were at first apprehensive and sought the aide of the United Stated of America in seeking a more congenial approach and solution to this situation. After countless attempts to involve the United States as an intermediary, in order to protect our soveriengty, the Empire of Japan invaded with their army and navy in the hope of removing Germany from the Far East. The presence of Germany in the Shantung Province, was considered by the Empire of Japan, to be a hinderence to their hegemony within the Far East; by removing them from Chinese territory, the Empire of Japan would be remving once and for all a roadblock in their Far Easr operations.
After the loss of 4,000 Japanese soldiers, the territory of Kiaochow was finally under the control of the Empire of Japan; because of the state of war between the Empire of Japan and the German Empire, it was agreed upon that the soveriegn teritory of Kiaochow would remain in the hand of the Empire of Japan until the cessation of hostiities between these two waring States. The Empire of Japan took over the military administration of Kiachow and sought the economic rights therein.
In 1915, the Republic of China was forced to entire ito negotiation with the Empire of Japan this culminated in our being forced into the signing of Treaties and Agreements, whereby we handed over our rights to control the sovereign territory of Shantung. These agreements decided whereby the former German rights in Shantung were to be transferred by Germany to Japan, who would there upon restore the Kiaochow leasehold to China, retaining certain of the economic rights in Shantung formerly enjoyed by Germany as payment for their efforts. These Treaties and Agreements also set forth the continued occupation of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and the opening of Manchuria and Mongolia to Japan for exploitation and colonization; that Japan control the main coal deposits of China; and, that the other powers be excluded from further territorial concessions. These Treaties and Agreements also solidified the economic control of Southern Manchuria by the Empire of Japan.
China does not feel these Treaties and Agreements should be respected as they were obtained through force majeure. They were only signed by the now deceased President Yuan, after the Japanese threatened to extend their invasion. In the end, only President Yuan signed these documents, the legislature of the Republic of China refused to accept this form of blackmail as set forth by the Empire of Japan. Without the aide of the United States, the Republic of China was incapable of checking Japan’s assertions of control in our sovereign affairs and as such, the Japanese army still remains on the sovereign territory of Manchuria and Shantung Province.
In the end, it was the actions of Germany that officially drew us into the War effort. On February 24, 1917, the French ship “Athos” was sunk in the Mediterranean by a German submarine. There were over 900 Chinese nationals aboard bound for work behind the lines in France, of these unfortunate souls 543 would drown. This fact, coupled with the formal reply of the German government on March 10 to our formal note of protest pertaining to Germany’s unrestricted Submarine warfare campaign the Republic of China moved closer to declaring war. The German Empire responded that it was unable to restrict the operations of the submarine campaign to meet our governments concerns.
In March, 1917, we the Republic of China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany at the invitation of the United States; this caused a level of struggle within the government and a discussion of whether to join the war on the side of the allies. Many within our government felt it was improper for the Republic of China to include itself in the affairs of the European Great Powers. But, our decision to enter the War was precipitated on many factors, some of which surrounded to actions of the Empire of Japan and their decision to annex Kiaochow; this act, led China down the path to war, as the German Empire made it perfectly clear that she held China to blame for this act of Japanese aggression. This coupled with the decision of the United States of America to enter into war with Germany, we the Republic of China chose to fully severe all ties to the German Empire and enter into a state of war.
On August 14, 1917 the formal declaration of war was delivered to the Dutch minister at Peking who was handling the affairs of the German Empire on Chinese soil as official relations had ended in March of that year. In the beginning, our war effort was severely limited by our lack of funds; if not for the decision of the United States of America, on April 24, to pass legislation enabling the issuing of loans to any nation at war with Germany, I do not think we would have been able to contribute anything to the war effort.
During the period of August 1917 and November 1918, the Republic of China sought to help its European and American Allies in anyway possible. In late 1918, we offered to send as many as 40,000 soldiers to Europe; this was dismissed as impractical by England and France. In 1917, the Western Allies could not come to any formalised agreement as to an approach to China’s involvement in the European Theatre of war. Because of the refusal of the England and France to accept our invitation to enter formal combat, and despite the forced deportation of our Austrian and German populations, no viable suggestions were put forth; so, China was forced to fight in the only way possible.
During this time, we seized German vessels in our mainland ports; we also seized the assets of a number of German banks, most notably the Deutsche Asiatische Bank in Shanghai and removed all German nationals from our Public Service. In October 1918, the Republic of China sought to intern certain Germans in the Western Hills, near Peking; we did not immediately take the advice of our allies and deport enmasse these citizens of an enemy nation. It was not until March, 1919 that we chose to deport these people to their ancestral homeland.
With the war ended, it now became time to set our sights on settling the peace. With the announcement of the Paris Peace Conference, the Republic of China set about formalising the claims and demands we wished to present to the Conference and in turn to the defeat nations of Europe, namely the German Republic.
In 1918, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, entered into secret negotiation with the Chinese Minister at Tokyo and upon secession of these negotiations the Republic of China was once again strong armed into re-accepting Japan’s claim to Shantung. When we came to Paris, we came with the hope of ending our subservience to Japan; we hoped to find friendly and willing allies in our fight for the attaining, once again, of our sovereign rights.
When we left Peking for Paris, the senior member of our delegation, Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang spoke with reporters and gave a glimpse of our proposed claims; they were:
1) The abolition of extraterritoriality;
2) The revision of tariffs;
3) The assuming of control and management of the railways of Eastern China by the Chinese government;
4) The return of the city of Tsingtao in the territory of Kiaochow; and,
5) The opening of Mongolia and Tibet, the areas within Chinese borders, to international traffic.
When we arrived in Paris, we met with representatives of the United States to gain their insight into possible courses of action. At these meetings, we proposed a paper by which we hoped to have our claims recognised. It provided for the renunciation by Germany and Austria-Hungary and the denunciation by China of all treaties and agreements between China and the other two governments. These treaties were to be denounced because they were “the offspring of acts of war.” Our hope with this paper was to guarantee the direct return of Shantung and all other captured Chinese territory directly to the Republic of China.
If successful, the Republic of China would have assured:
1) The restoration of the leased territory of Kiaochow and cancellation of all German railway, mining, and other rights in Shantung;
2) The annulment of extraterritorial rights hitherto enjoyed by the subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary;
3) The abrogation of all treaties and agreements between China and Germany and Austria-Hungary.
In January, we presented our claims to the Council of Ten, our representative
Wellington Koo made an impassioned speech before the assembled delegates and it was felt we would be victorious. Initially we called for the abrogation of the Shantung Treaty and Agreements of 1915, but by the end of April, we were asking that all the 1915 and 1918 Treaties and Agreements be abrogated, including those applying to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
Our concerns were finally disposed of by the Council of Three, consisting of President Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau. The Council of Three assented in toto to the Japanese claims, and the articles covering the disposal of the German rights in Shantung were incorporated in the final treaty essentially as they had originally been proposed by the Japanese representatives.
The Republic of China had based our claims on two considerations. The first one was that in justice to China and, by implication at least, in conformity with the Fourteen Points, the leased territory of Kiaochow and the former German rights in China should be restored directly to China. China’s belligerency has itself put an end to the leases obtained by Germany in Chinese territory. The second consideration was the appeal to the Great Powers based on the fact that they have all at one time or another pledged themselves to preserve Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The Japanese representative Baron Makino, contended that since Japan was in actual possession of the territory under consideration, it must, before disposing of it to a third party, it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free disposal from Germany. We, the Republic of China, contended that the nature by which Kiaochow was in Japanese possession was not at issue. We viewed this as an issue involving the choice of direct and indirect restitution. We would prefer the first as we have always considered all the Conventions made with Japan as provisional and subject to revision by the Peace Conference. Furthermore, we contended before the Council of Three, that there was a clause in the original Sino-Germany Treaty to the effect that Germany could not transfer her rights to another power. Our claims were based on the assumption that our entrance into the war abrogated these 1915 agreements and gave China the right to demand directly from Germany the restitution of the German rights in Shantung.
While in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference, the Republic of China only had one real ally and they were the American representatives and in particular President Wilson. It was President Wilson who asserted our right to present a case to the Conference and it was because of his actions that the Shantung Question took on such an important role in the Conference Room. Our inability to win any of our claims was precipitated on the fact of our virtual absence from the Conference deliberations. The inclusion of Japan within these deliberations enabled their ability to adapt to the changing atmosphere within the Council Chamber. The Republic of China was forced to rely on the occasional bit of advice passed on by the United States representatives.
Through the month of May, 1919, the Republic of China and her delegates sought to have the decision re-examined, then, failing this, to be permitted to sign the Treaty with reservations to the Shantung articles. Our requests were met with a resounding “no”; we sought the right to make a statement of reservations outside the treaty while at the same time accepting the Treaty as it stood. This too was refused.
On June 28, the Treaty was signed by all the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, with one exception. The Republic of China alone has chosen to abstain from this final ceremony.
The Republic of China did not wish to go to war with Germany; a State we considered to be our friends upon until the day of the armistice. In the time since their aggressive occupation of Kiaochow, the German people had endeared themselves to the people of China. Our decision to enter the war was not based upon the actions of a European power, but on that of our neighbour the Empire of Japan. By entering the war effort, we hoped to become a check on their growing hegemony in our region; we had hoped to gain the ability to negotiate directly with Germany for the return of our sovereign territory. In the end, our ability to safeguard our own sovereignty has now been destroyed; by the Peace Conference’s acceptance of Baron Makino contention that Japan has a right to Shantung Province, we have slipped deeper into the Japanese sphere of control.
On August of 1914, the European Theatre of the Great War began; it would be three years before the Republic of China entered this war on the side of the Allied forces. In our long history with the Western Great Powers, China has always been forced into a subservient role; with our entry into the Great War, we had hoped to enter as equals fighting alongside our European and American allies. In the end, we would be denied this opportunity and our program denied by all members of the Group of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference.
In 1914, the Republic of China was deeply distressed by the battles being waged on European soil; but, it was not until April of 1917 that we entered this war. During the outbreak of fighting and our entrance, the Republic of China would approach the prospect of checking Germany’s hegemony in the Far East with great trepidation. In 1898, Emperor Guang Xu signed the Sino-German Treaty which gave sovereign control of Kiachow Bay in China’s Northern Shantung Province to the German Empire. After seceding this territtory to Germany, we were also forced to hand over economic rights to this territory and all land immediately ajacent to the Bay.
We longed for the return of our sovereign territory and when in 1914 the Empire of Japan offered to remove the German presence from our soil, we were at first apprehensive and sought the aide of the United Stated of America in seeking a more congenial approach and solution to this situation. After countless attempts to involve the United States as an intermediary, in order to protect our soveriengty, the Empire of Japan invaded with their army and navy in the hope of removing Germany from the Far East. The presence of Germany in the Shantung Province, was considered by the Empire of Japan, to be a hinderence to their hegemony within the Far East; by removing them from Chinese territory, the Empire of Japan would be remving once and for all a roadblock in their Far Easr operations.
After the loss of 4,000 Japanese soldiers, the territory of Kiaochow was finally under the control of the Empire of Japan; because of the state of war between the Empire of Japan and the German Empire, it was agreed upon that the soveriegn teritory of Kiaochow would remain in the hand of the Empire of Japan until the cessation of hostiities between these two waring States. The Empire of Japan took over the military administration of Kiachow and sought the economic rights therein.
In 1915, the Republic of China was forced to entire ito negotiation with the Empire of Japan this culminated in our being forced into the signing of Treaties and Agreements, whereby we handed over our rights to control the sovereign territory of Shantung. These agreements decided whereby the former German rights in Shantung were to be transferred by Germany to Japan, who would there upon restore the Kiaochow leasehold to China, retaining certain of the economic rights in Shantung formerly enjoyed by Germany as payment for their efforts. These Treaties and Agreements also set forth the continued occupation of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and the opening of Manchuria and Mongolia to Japan for exploitation and colonization; that Japan control the main coal deposits of China; and, that the other powers be excluded from further territorial concessions. These Treaties and Agreements also solidified the economic control of Southern Manchuria by the Empire of Japan.
China does not feel these Treaties and Agreements should be respected as they were obtained through force majeure. They were only signed by the now deceased President Yuan, after the Japanese threatened to extend their invasion. In the end, only President Yuan signed these documents, the legislature of the Republic of China refused to accept this form of blackmail as set forth by the Empire of Japan. Without the aide of the United States, the Republic of China was incapable of checking Japan’s assertions of control in our sovereign affairs and as such, the Japanese army still remains on the sovereign territory of Manchuria and Shantung Province.
In the end, it was the actions of Germany that officially drew us into the War effort. On February 24, 1917, the French ship “Athos” was sunk in the Mediterranean by a German submarine. There were over 900 Chinese nationals aboard bound for work behind the lines in France, of these unfortunate souls 543 would drown. This fact, coupled with the formal reply of the German government on March 10 to our formal note of protest pertaining to Germany’s unrestricted Submarine warfare campaign the Republic of China moved closer to declaring war. The German Empire responded that it was unable to restrict the operations of the submarine campaign to meet our governments concerns.
In March, 1917, we the Republic of China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany at the invitation of the United States; this caused a level of struggle within the government and a discussion of whether to join the war on the side of the allies. Many within our government felt it was improper for the Republic of China to include itself in the affairs of the European Great Powers. But, our decision to enter the War was precipitated on many factors, some of which surrounded to actions of the Empire of Japan and their decision to annex Kiaochow; this act, led China down the path to war, as the German Empire made it perfectly clear that she held China to blame for this act of Japanese aggression. This coupled with the decision of the United States of America to enter into war with Germany, we the Republic of China chose to fully severe all ties to the German Empire and enter into a state of war.
On August 14, 1917 the formal declaration of war was delivered to the Dutch minister at Peking who was handling the affairs of the German Empire on Chinese soil as official relations had ended in March of that year. In the beginning, our war effort was severely limited by our lack of funds; if not for the decision of the United States of America, on April 24, to pass legislation enabling the issuing of loans to any nation at war with Germany, I do not think we would have been able to contribute anything to the war effort.
During the period of August 1917 and November 1918, the Republic of China sought to help its European and American Allies in anyway possible. In late 1918, we offered to send as many as 40,000 soldiers to Europe; this was dismissed as impractical by England and France. In 1917, the Western Allies could not come to any formalised agreement as to an approach to China’s involvement in the European Theatre of war. Because of the refusal of the England and France to accept our invitation to enter formal combat, and despite the forced deportation of our Austrian and German populations, no viable suggestions were put forth; so, China was forced to fight in the only way possible.
During this time, we seized German vessels in our mainland ports; we also seized the assets of a number of German banks, most notably the Deutsche Asiatische Bank in Shanghai and removed all German nationals from our Public Service. In October 1918, the Republic of China sought to intern certain Germans in the Western Hills, near Peking; we did not immediately take the advice of our allies and deport enmasse these citizens of an enemy nation. It was not until March, 1919 that we chose to deport these people to their ancestral homeland.
With the war ended, it now became time to set our sights on settling the peace. With the announcement of the Paris Peace Conference, the Republic of China set about formalising the claims and demands we wished to present to the Conference and in turn to the defeat nations of Europe, namely the German Republic.
In 1918, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, entered into secret negotiation with the Chinese Minister at Tokyo and upon secession of these negotiations the Republic of China was once again strong armed into re-accepting Japan’s claim to Shantung. When we came to Paris, we came with the hope of ending our subservience to Japan; we hoped to find friendly and willing allies in our fight for the attaining, once again, of our sovereign rights.
When we left Peking for Paris, the senior member of our delegation, Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang spoke with reporters and gave a glimpse of our proposed claims; they were:
1) The abolition of extraterritoriality;
2) The revision of tariffs;
3) The assuming of control and management of the railways of Eastern China by the Chinese government;
4) The return of the city of Tsingtao in the territory of Kiaochow; and,
5) The opening of Mongolia and Tibet, the areas within Chinese borders, to international traffic.
When we arrived in Paris, we met with representatives of the United States to gain their insight into possible courses of action. At these meetings, we proposed a paper by which we hoped to have our claims recognised. It provided for the renunciation by Germany and Austria-Hungary and the denunciation by China of all treaties and agreements between China and the other two governments. These treaties were to be denounced because they were “the offspring of acts of war.” Our hope with this paper was to guarantee the direct return of Shantung and all other captured Chinese territory directly to the Republic of China.
If successful, the Republic of China would have assured:
1) The restoration of the leased territory of Kiaochow and cancellation of all German railway, mining, and other rights in Shantung;
2) The annulment of extraterritorial rights hitherto enjoyed by the subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary;
3) The abrogation of all treaties and agreements between China and Germany and Austria-Hungary.
In January, we presented our claims to the Council of Ten, our representative
Wellington Koo made an impassioned speech before the assembled delegates and it was felt we would be victorious. Initially we called for the abrogation of the Shantung Treaty and Agreements of 1915, but by the end of April, we were asking that all the 1915 and 1918 Treaties and Agreements be abrogated, including those applying to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
Our concerns were finally disposed of by the Council of Three, consisting of President Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau. The Council of Three assented in toto to the Japanese claims, and the articles covering the disposal of the German rights in Shantung were incorporated in the final treaty essentially as they had originally been proposed by the Japanese representatives.
The Republic of China had based our claims on two considerations. The first one was that in justice to China and, by implication at least, in conformity with the Fourteen Points, the leased territory of Kiaochow and the former German rights in China should be restored directly to China. China’s belligerency has itself put an end to the leases obtained by Germany in Chinese territory. The second consideration was the appeal to the Great Powers based on the fact that they have all at one time or another pledged themselves to preserve Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The Japanese representative Baron Makino, contended that since Japan was in actual possession of the territory under consideration, it must, before disposing of it to a third party, it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free disposal from Germany. We, the Republic of China, contended that the nature by which Kiaochow was in Japanese possession was not at issue. We viewed this as an issue involving the choice of direct and indirect restitution. We would prefer the first as we have always considered all the Conventions made with Japan as provisional and subject to revision by the Peace Conference. Furthermore, we contended before the Council of Three, that there was a clause in the original Sino-Germany Treaty to the effect that Germany could not transfer her rights to another power. Our claims were based on the assumption that our entrance into the war abrogated these 1915 agreements and gave China the right to demand directly from Germany the restitution of the German rights in Shantung.
While in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference, the Republic of China only had one real ally and they were the American representatives and in particular President Wilson. It was President Wilson who asserted our right to present a case to the Conference and it was because of his actions that the Shantung Question took on such an important role in the Conference Room. Our inability to win any of our claims was precipitated on the fact of our virtual absence from the Conference deliberations. The inclusion of Japan within these deliberations enabled their ability to adapt to the changing atmosphere within the Council Chamber. The Republic of China was forced to rely on the occasional bit of advice passed on by the United States representatives.
Through the month of May, 1919, the Republic of China and her delegates sought to have the decision re-examined, then, failing this, to be permitted to sign the Treaty with reservations to the Shantung articles. Our requests were met with a resounding “no”; we sought the right to make a statement of reservations outside the treaty while at the same time accepting the Treaty as it stood. This too was refused.
On June 28, the Treaty was signed by all the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, with one exception. The Republic of China alone has chosen to abstain from this final ceremony.
The Republic of China did not wish to go to war with Germany; a State we considered to be our friends upon until the day of the armistice. In the time since their aggressive occupation of Kiaochow, the German people had endeared themselves to the people of China. Our decision to enter the war was not based upon the actions of a European power, but on that of our neighbour the Empire of Japan. By entering the war effort, we hoped to become a check on their growing hegemony in our region; we had hoped to gain the ability to negotiate directly with Germany for the return of our sovereign territory. In the end, our ability to safeguard our own sovereignty has now been destroyed; by the Peace Conference’s acceptance of Baron Makino contention that Japan has a right to Shantung Province, we have slipped deeper into the Japanese sphere of control.
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