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英语翻译
The end of constitutionalism becomes maintenance of an inheritance from the Founders,who must be approached with a kind of reverence.Maintenance,accordingly,requires a new form of auto-theory.Originalism,in turn,is undermined by the belief thatsuch reverence amounts to submission to the dead hand of the past and is thus inconsistent with the norm of self-government.Originalism simply has no way to resolve this tension between maintenance and self-construction.It must,therefore,give way to ideas of an evolving,unwritten constitution.The true constitution now appears to be not the dead letter of a past generation,but an evolving set of historical practices that grow with the nation.The genealogical account does not end here,but this is enough to see how it is an ordered progression through a domain of limited possibilities.This progression offers a genealogy of the distinctive character of contemporary theory with its dominant concerns for discourse and narrative within an interpretive community.
An architectural approach to auto-theroy begins with the recognition that historically determined paradigms survive not simply as remanants,but as positions that remains attractive to individuals and groups.Originalism may be displaced as the dominant paradigm,but it remains a resource for argument within legal practic.Architecture investigates how the variety of approaches continue to relate ro each other.As in the other areas of inquirty,there is no single scheme of relationships.These paradigms can be related along dimensions of reason and will,For example,the legitimating moment of will--consent--cant be located in the past(Robert Bork on originalism),the present(John Ely on democratic process),or the future (Alexander Bickel on emerging consensus).In the dimension of reason,one might locate the legitimating form of reason in abstract principles of morality (John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin),in a process of reason-giving(Cass Sunstein or Frank Michelman),or even in a form of reason working itself out through social evolution(nineteenth-century social Darwinsit views).Given our conceptual resources there are a limited number of positions available.We are not in a position to argue that constitutional law is legitimate because,for example,it is dicinelu inspired or because it is an expression of the sublime.
In the end,all thories of the legitimacy of constitutional law fail because the task of reconciling self-government and temporality is not achievable.This,however,is a statement made from outside the practice.From the exterior,the endeavor looks like a contradiction.From the interior,all of these theories succeed,although not in the
The end of constitutionalism becomes maintenance of an inheritance from the Founders,who must be approached with a kind of reverence.Maintenance,accordingly,requires a new form of auto-theory.Originalism,in turn,is undermined by the belief thatsuch reverence amounts to submission to the dead hand of the past and is thus inconsistent with the norm of self-government.Originalism simply has no way to resolve this tension between maintenance and self-construction.It must,therefore,give way to ideas of an evolving,unwritten constitution.The true constitution now appears to be not the dead letter of a past generation,but an evolving set of historical practices that grow with the nation.The genealogical account does not end here,but this is enough to see how it is an ordered progression through a domain of limited possibilities.This progression offers a genealogy of the distinctive character of contemporary theory with its dominant concerns for discourse and narrative within an interpretive community.
An architectural approach to auto-theroy begins with the recognition that historically determined paradigms survive not simply as remanants,but as positions that remains attractive to individuals and groups.Originalism may be displaced as the dominant paradigm,but it remains a resource for argument within legal practic.Architecture investigates how the variety of approaches continue to relate ro each other.As in the other areas of inquirty,there is no single scheme of relationships.These paradigms can be related along dimensions of reason and will,For example,the legitimating moment of will--consent--cant be located in the past(Robert Bork on originalism),the present(John Ely on democratic process),or the future (Alexander Bickel on emerging consensus).In the dimension of reason,one might locate the legitimating form of reason in abstract principles of morality (John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin),in a process of reason-giving(Cass Sunstein or Frank Michelman),or even in a form of reason working itself out through social evolution(nineteenth-century social Darwinsit views).Given our conceptual resources there are a limited number of positions available.We are not in a position to argue that constitutional law is legitimate because,for example,it is dicinelu inspired or because it is an expression of the sublime.
In the end,all thories of the legitimacy of constitutional law fail because the task of reconciling self-government and temporality is not achievable.This,however,is a statement made from outside the practice.From the exterior,the endeavor looks like a contradiction.From the interior,all of these theories succeed,although not in the
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